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Sex Wars and (Trans) Gender Panics: Identity and Body Politics in Contemporary UK 
Feminism. 
Introduction 
In 2017 the UK Government announced that it would undertake a review of the 2004 Gender 
Recognition Act (GRA). The GRA had been significant in enabling trans people to change 
their birth certificates to their acquired gender without the requirement of surgical 
interventions. The Act also made it possible for trans people to marry after doing so. These 
were key rights that, prior to 2004, had been denied.  The GRA then was, at the time, an 
important piece of legislation, although its limitations were always evident.  First, the GRA 
did not recognise people who fell outside, or between, the binary categories of male or 
female. Second, it granted only heterosexual people the right to marry. Third, although the 
Act did not insist on surgery, the criterion for gender recognition involved a long and overly 
bureaucratic process that was dependent upon the consent of medical practitioners and 
psychologists. Many trans rights and allied groups argued that these restrictions and demands 
were outdated and should be revoked (see Hines, 2013).   
On embarking on the legal review process in 2018, the UK Government opened a public 
consultation on the law as it stood, wherein a key question concerned the right to self-identify 
when applying for gender recognition. Campaigning organisations argued that this would 
make the recognition process simpler, faster and would, importantly, untangle recognition 
from a problematic history of medical pathologization whereby trans people had to accept a 
diagnosis of mental illness before being recognised in their acquired gender.  
As this chapter will address, proposals for self-identification have proved highly contentious 
within some sections of feminism; serving to open old wounds in debates around feminism 
and trans people (Hines, 2018). Since the mid-2000s, deliberations within feminism around 
trans lives have intensified to the degree that such contestations currently represent polarized 
positions. This chapter speaks to, and seeks to go beyond, these fissures. At the heart of 
current debates lay divergent understandings of the ontology of the categories of ‘sex’ and 
‘gender’ and conflicting understandings of their relationship. Accordingly, the chapter begins 
by considering the meanings of sex and gender within a historical context; exploring theories 
of sex variation and attending to the construction of a sex/gender binary within 19th century 
European thought.  
Differing ontological frameworks have persisted and, as the chapter moves on to address, 
have deeply impacted upon the epistemology of ‘woman’ within feminist theory and politics. 
Further, as the chapter explores, questions around the definition of ‘sex’, both in relation to 
womanhood and more widely, are at the heart of these tensions.  The chapter subsequently 
examines these issues within, and beyond, second wave feminist thought and activism. It then 
turns to examine recent social, cultural and legal change in the UK, which provides the 
backdrop to current feminist disputes. Here the chapter pays particular attention to the ways 
in which battle lines have been erected – and shattered – around bodies and identities within 
what have become marked as ‘gender critical’ and ‘trans inclusive’ feminist positions.          
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With the aim of thinking beyond the current trenchant nature of UK debate, the last part of 
the chapter sets out issues of commonality between feminist and trans politics, paying 
particular attention to politics of the body. In conclusion I argue for a reconsideration of 
feminist understandings of sex and gender in order to fully unite trans and feminist projects.  
Historicizing Sex and Gender Categories 
The ways in which the categories of sex and gender have been understood have never been 
consistent. The work of sexual historians thus explores multiple ways in which the human 
body has been comprehended in the ‘West’ from the time of ancient Greece through to 19th 
century Europe (Foucault, 1972; Weeks, Laqueur, 1992; Doan, 2013; Weeks, 2017). 
Anthropological scholarship also indicates great historical divergence in understandings of 
the constitution of ‘male’ and ‘female’ across time and culture (Borshay and DeVore, 1968; 
Kuhn and Stiner, 2006; Dyble et al. 2015). Drawing on this historical and anthropological 
scholarship enables the argument to be forwarded that rather than biology, it is social, 
cultural, political and economic factors that bring into being distinct ways of understanding 
sex, gender and their relationship.          
During the 19th century, sexology – the scientific study of sex – came to dominate European 
understandings of human behaviour. Sex difference was positioned as biologically driven and 
considered constitutive of human behaviour; bodily difference became absolute. From this 
perspective, the bodily differences of men and women not only set them apart physically, 
they determined disparities in personality trait, behavioural characteristic and social role. 
Uppermost to a model of sex dimorphism was reproduction.  The capacity of a woman to 
gestate – and of a man to impregnate – became the foundation of 19th century formulations of 
what men and women were. Thus, the essence of gender – of being a man or a woman – was 
tied to reproductive function. Feminist writers have produced a huge body of work on the 
ways in which women were essentially tied to their bodies in 19th century scientific thought 
and have created rich and varied accounts of the damages wrought on women’s lives by these 
biological models (de Beauvoir, 1949; Firestone, 1970; Rich, 1979; Young, 1980; Lorde, 
1984; Butler, 1990; Scott, 1992; Grosz, 1994; Ahmed, 2000; Alcoff, 2006). Additionally, 
masculinity theorists have written of the limitations this framework has placed on men’s self-
expectations, experiences and emotional lives (Connell, 2005; Kimell and Messner, 2010; 
Nayak, 2006; Pascoe, 2007). More recently, scholars are recognising the confines of binary 
gender categorisation, especially for those who live beyond or between the categories of male 
or female (Bornstein,1994; Richards, Bouman and Barker, 2017; Iantaffi and Barker, 2019). 
Central to the formulation of sexed and gendered difference was a binary model wherein 
male and female were polarized. Commonalities between men and women were negated as 
dissimilarities were underscored. Further – and crucially – variations between the binaries of 
male and female became pathologized.  Yet such pathologization could not be possible 
without recognition of bodies – and experiences – that were beyond the binary.  Thus, 
throughout the 19th Century, bodies and identities that lay across or outside of the 
male/female binary became visible.  Here we arrive at the work sexologists Magnus 
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Hirschfeld (1910) and Havelock Ellis (1915) who developed understandings of gender 
diversity in which gender and sexuality became to be seen as distinct.   
Prior to this, gender diversity had been understood within European sexology through the 
same framework as homosexuality – as an inferior imitation of heterosexuality emerging 
from biological error. This shifted as cross-gender identification began to be articulated as a 
distinct ‘condition’ and incorporated in what Michael Foucault (1976) described as the 
medicalisation of the ‘peculiar’. The term ‘transvestite’ developed out of Hirschfeld’s study 
‘Tranvestites’ in which he defined cross-dressing as ‘the impulse to assume the external garb 
of a sex which is not apparently that of the subject as indicated by the sexual organ’ (1928, 
p.13).  Here we see, for the first time in European sexological thought, the conceptualisation 
of gendered behaviour as separate from sexuality.  Moreover, the possibilities that gender 
identity could be distinct from genital appearance emerged.  Similarly, Ellis (1915) wrote 
against the prevalence of collapsing same-sex desire and gender diverse practices.  
What was termed ‘cross-dressing’ became separated from the desire to ‘live’ as the sex that 
was not ascribed at birth; most notably through American sexological work by Harry 
Benjamin (1966), Robert Stoller (1968) and John Money (1972). The divergent terms 
‘transvestism’ and ‘transsexualism’ were so coined.  Central to these developments was the 
notion that transsexual people were born into the ‘wrong body’.  Surgical procedures, which 
had been developing throughout this time and were increasingly available, were positioned as 
the appropriate ‘treatment’ to the wrong body condition.  What was then known as ‘sex 
change’ surgery was proffered to bring the body into alignment with identity (Hines, 2007; 
2018).  My point here is not to suggest that gender diversity became de-pathologized through 
this later sexological work; indeed, pathology was key. Rather, the source of pathology 
changed – from a defect of sexuality to one of sex.  Moreover, during this time an 
understanding of the possibility that the sexed body may be distinct from how a person 
presented, or felt, their gender emerged. 
Woman and the Feminist Subject 
Conceptualizations of the differences between sex – as biological – and gender – as cultural – 
were crucial to second wave feminist thought. The sex/gender binary thus became principal. 
Through the 1960s and 1970s studies of gender – as separate from sex – materialized through 
feminist work.  Gender, it was stressed, was a social category, which was imposed and 
internalised across multiple sites – the family, education, work, the media, politics, health and 
medicine, consumerism – with the effect of limiting women’s experiences and reducing 
power.  As Florence Binard reflects, through the British Women’s Liberation Movement 
(BWLM): ‘women became aware that their subordinate position to men was not determined 
by so-called natural traits but mostly due to conditioning through unequal social structures’ 
(Binard, 2017). She continues: 
They were realising that there are no fundamental differences between the sexes bar 
those concerned with reproduction and this growing awareness that the “feminine 
destiny” was a myth led them to question their positions on both political and personal 
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grounds. The BWLM was a national movement that gathered its strength from its 
grassroots at local level, through the creation and existence of thousands of women’s 
groups throughout the country. It was characterised by a myriad different type of 
public actions led by women that ranged from demonstrations, protest marches, 
strikes to music festivals, artistic events or drama performances; from workshops to 
conferences, that were heavily publicised and analysed thanks to a flourishing 
multifaceted feminist press.       
(Binard, 2017) 
What became known as ‘anti-essentialism’ importantly untied gender from biological 
characteristics. Yet, although, the biological basis of ‘gender’ was seriously disrupted through 
these interventions, the biological premise of ‘sex’ remained fixed within much feminist 
thought; as reflected in Anne Oakley’s distinction of sex and gender at the time:  
‘Sex’ is a word that refers to the biological differences between male and female: the 
visible difference in genitalia, the related difference in procreative function. ‘Gender’ 
however is a matter of culture: it refers to the social classification into ‘masculine’ 
and ‘feminine.’  
(Oakley, 1972) 
Indeed, the understanding of gender as culturally constructed appeared through a binary 
model wherein the biological basis of sex was reinforced. As subsequent discussions in this 
chapter will address, the argument that sex arrives from biology has haunted feminist politics 
around trans issues in the 21st Century. 
As ‘woman’ was untied from biology, she became rooted in culture; as Simone de Beauvoir 
(1953) famously insisted ‘One is not born, but rather becomes a woman’.  A woman, then, 
was someone who had been socialised from birth into the restrictive structures of patriarchy 
and had endured subsequent oppressive life-experience. Later, feminist scholar and 
anthropologist Gayle Rubin explicitly articulated a framework in which sex and gender were 
distinct. In Rubin’s work, the 'sex/gender system' marked ‘a set of arrangements by which the 
biological raw material of human sex and procreation is shaped by human, social 
intervention’ (1975, p. 165).  
Rubin’s distinction between sex and gender became the cornerstone of 2nd wave feminism, 
though that is not to say that sex remained de-politicized. American radical feminist writer 
Shulamith Firestone (1970), for example, argued that women’s oppression arose from their 
reproductive capacity and positioned reproductive technologies as feminist utopia that would 
free women from the burdens of pregnancy. While in the UK socialist feminism emerged as 
the dominant feminist framework, reproduction was also central. Here concerns about 
reproduction were around the medicalization of childbirth, the lack of childcare provided by 
the State, and the unwillingness of male partners to carry out childcare and domestic labour.  
The inequalities brought by reproduction, a socialist feminist school of thought also 
maintained, were remnant of unenlightened thought that tied women to their biology.  
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Equality in social and intimate spheres, and the development of law and policy to better 
support women’s in the public sphere, were stressed as the way forward.  Yet feminist 
understanding that sex, as well as gender, was culturally shaped soon began to emerge. 
French feminist theorist Christine Delphy (1984) was a forerunner in a feminist rethinking of 
sex – and its relationship to gender. Delphy questioned what lay at the crux of the sex/gender 
binary; the presumption that gender arises from the natural essence that is sex: 
   We have continued to think of gender in terms of sex: to see it as a social dichotomy 
 determined by a natural dichotomy. We now see gender as the content with sex as the 
 container. [...] the container is considered to be invariable because it is part of nature, 
 and nature ‘does not change’.        
(Delphy, 1984, p. 52) 
For Delphy, this model represented upturned thought. Instead, Delphy theorised sex as 
coming from gender; sexed differences are read through gender, not the other way around.  
As Diane Richardson explains ‘without the concept of gender we could not make sense of 
bodies as differently sexed’ (2015, p. 7).  This, Delphy suggested, creates a paradox for 
feminism: 
 Feminists seem to want to abolish hierarchy and even sex roles, but not difference 
 itself. They want to abolish the contents but not the container. They all want to keep 
 some elements of gender. Some want to keep more, others less, but at the very least 
 they want to maintain the classification. Very few indeed are happy to contemplate 
 there being simply anatomical sexual differences which are not given any social 
 significance or symbolic value.      
(Delphy, 1984, p. 52) 
As feminist theory entered the 1990s, more scholars joined Delphy in her task to eradicate the 
container as well as spilling its contents. Judith Butler’s work thus explored sex, not just 
gender, as a socially constructed concept: 
 When the constructed status of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, 
 gender  itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that man and 
 masculine might just as easily signify a female body as a male one, and woman and 
 feminine a male body as easily as a female one.      
(Butler, 1990, p. 6) 
Subsequently – and critically – Western feminist understandings of the categories of gender 
and sex as distinct enabled the recognition that gender was not binary. As the sex/gender 
binary was disturbed so too was the binary of male/female, leading to the acknowledgement 
of gender as potentially plural and allowing for gender expressions that were non-binary. 
Genders were thus made visible in feminist thought. Elsewhere in the world, though, the 
variation of sex was not a novel idea and there is, as discussed, much historical and 
anthropological work that indicates the variable characteristics of sex, which takes account of 
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intersex conditions as well as the many distinct conceptualisations and practices of sex and 
gender in non-Western cultures.  Foucault’s work (1975), in particular, has been instrumental 
in exploring how bodies come into being through historical processes. His notion of ‘bio-
power’, whereby bodies are subjugated and regulated by modern nation states, was taken up 
by feminist scholars to theorise the social control of women’s bodies (Butler, 1990, Grosz, 
1994). In their work on intersex, scholars such as Katherine O’Donovan (1985), Alice Dreger 
(2000) and Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000) has provided an explicit illustration of biopower; 
bringing to light the ways in which medical intervention on babies with ambiguously sexed 
bodies are made male or female. This body of work is also important in illustrating how 
medical discourse and practice has fluctuated with regards to characterising sex. Thus: 
  [...] what biological ‘facts’ determine sex have been the subject of much debate. 
 Chromosomes, hormones, gonads (ovaries/testes), internal reproductive structures and 
 genitalia have variously been seen as the basis for defining a person’s sex.  For 
 instance, studies of medical responses to ‘doubtful sex’ – people who in the past were 
 often referred to as third sex or hermaphrodites or more commonly nowadays intersex 
 – suggest that definitions of what constitutes the male and the female body have 
 changed.         
(Richardson, 2015, p. 7)  
Steven Rose’s (1998) analysis of the development of the mind-body dichotomy as it emerged 
through Enlightenment thinking is relevant here. As the body became tied to biology, Rose 
suggests, biology became separated from the social. Accompanying the male/female binary, 
then, from this reading, the sex/gender binary is a product of a specific historical time and 
circumstance. In countering sex/gender as an eternal or natural fact was also the vibrant work 
of feminist socio-biologists such as Myra Hird (2002) and Joan Roughgarden (2004) who 
documented the sexed variation of the natural and animal world to insist on the naturalness of 
diversity itself – including that of the human.  Moreover, much important work has pointed to 
the ways in which the sex/binary model was constructed as a part of a colonial project.  Tom 
Boellstorff et al (2014) thus argue for ‘decolonizing transgender’ by centring the gendered 
histories, identities, languages and understandings of indigenous peoples and people of 
colour. From a decolonial perspective, the category of transgender itself is a product of white 
colonial rule in which local understandings and practices of gender diversity were 
disappeared. A project of trans decolonialisation thus starts with a critique of western and 
white gender theory and seeks to explore the impact that colonialism, racism and whiteness 
have had on the gendered understandings and practices of indigenous peoples and people of 
colour (see Binahohan, 2014).  
None of this is to argue that the body – or sex – does not matter.  As feminist thought and 
politics has undeniably argued, the gendering of bodies means that women are subject to 
discrimination because of, and through, their bodies in ways that men are not.  The 
contention, then, is not around whether the sexed body is material. The question in point 
surrounds the material nuances of the sexed body; an issue that became more vital – and 
increasingly vexed – as feminism turned its attention to transgender matters.  
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Trans Visibility and the Ghost of Sex  
Much has been written about the strain of feminism that has become known as ‘trans 
exclusionary radical feminism’, by scholars such as Carol Riddell (1996), Sandy Stone 
(1991) and Julia Serano (2007; 2013). I also have written widely on the relationship between 
feminism and trans issues (Hines, 2005, 2007, 2014, 2019). Here I do not wish to return to a 
prolonged discussion of the arguments and political cultures of those second wave feminists 
who positioned trans perspectives as inherently un-feminist (Raymond, 1979; Jeffries, 1997). 
Suffice to say, that this argument rests on a rigid reading of the sex/gender binary and an 
essentialist understanding of ‘woman’ (and man) as one who was identified as such at birth 
on the basis of genital observation. Hence in Raymond’s inversion of de Beauvoir, one does 
not become, but is born a woman.  
Trans writers lucidly articulated the harms and exclusions experienced through the tying of 
gender to an essentialist understanding of sex (Feinberg, 1996; Riddell, 1996; Rubin, H. 
1996; Stone, 1996, Halberstam, 1998; Stryker, 1998), and both trans and gender studies 
scholars carefully troubled a reductive reading of sex, gender and sexuality (Hollibaugh, 
1989; Rubin 1989; Vance, 1989; Butler, 1990; Grosz, 1994).  What is more, feminist writers 
and, later queer scholars, continued to write against a singular feminist ontological position of 
the sex/gender binary. Monique Wittig (1980), for example, positioned the categories of man 
and woman as political, rather than distinct essentialist, categories. Jane Flax (1997) and 
Cressida Hayes (2000) articulated an increasingly plural feminism; enunciating the 
impossibilities of speaking for ‘woman’, as such a unified subject position does not exist.  In 
thinking back to this feminist literature, the necessity of examining the conditions under 
which the sex/gender distinction has become fiercely reinstated in recent years in UK 
feminism becomes clear.   
The new millennium instigated unprecedented awareness of trans people in social and 
cultural spheres in the UK (Hines, 2007). Cultural fascination with the lives and, above all, 
the bodies of trans people has continued unabated. Alongside a social and cultural turn to 
trans (Hines, 2007, 2014) trans rights were put on the legal and political agenda.  Following 
prolonged lobbying from trans rights organisations, the 2004 Gender Recognition Act (GRA, 
2004) enabled trans people over the age of eighteen, who were not in a pre-transition 
marriage and who identified as male or female, to change their birth certificates to reflect 
their acquired gender. The Act was ground-breaking in that it was the first gender recognition 
law in the world that did not require sterilization (see Honkasalo, 2018). Yet many trans 
people were excluded from this new framework of rights; notably non-binary people, young 
trans people and people who remained married to their partners from before their transition. 
Subsequent lobbying around these gaps led to a wide-spread government consultation on the 
GRA, which has indicated the ways in which the current law is unfit for purpose. In 
particular, the lengthy and complicated process currently required to register for a ‘gender 
recognition certificate’, which is needed before changes in documentation (gender 
recognition) can be processed, is untenable.  Legal administrative changes to shorten and 
simplify the process have thus been proposed. A model of self-identification or self-
declaration, which de-centres the involvement of medical practitioners and psychiatrists, has 
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been projected in order to streamline the recognition process.  Such a move can be 
contextualised within international campaigns for self-determination law and will bring the 
UK legal process in accordance with processes in many other countries across Europe and the 
globe, including Argentina, Malta, Norway, Pakistan and Uruguay, all of which inscribe self-
identity into gender identity law.    
While finding favour with trans rights organisations and proving unproblematic for most 
feminists, over the past five years there has emerged a vehement backlash against the 
proposed changes to the GRA from a minority of feminist groups who argue that self- 
declaration of will reduce the safety and well-being of cis1 women.  At the hub of this battle 
is the sex/gender binary wherein ‘sex’ is reinstated as the primary source of women’s 
oppression in order to agitate against trans rights. More so, reproductive function has gained 
primacy as the fundamental site of women’s disadvantage.  
Amidst the UK Government’s consultation on the GRA, the feminist organisation ‘A 
Woman’s Place UK’ (WPUK) formed in 2017.  The primary goal of WPUK is to agitate 
against self-declaration of gender within recognition processes. Such a move, it is argued, 
would open women’s spaces, such as toilets, changing rooms and crisis centres, to men. 
Consequently, their guidance on the GRA consultation, states:  
‘We believe that a change to self-identification is likely to threaten the rights of 
women and girls, as well as those with other protected characteristics, and that the 
government must consider carefully the impact of these changes before attempting to 
bring them into law.’  
(womansplaceuk.org/wpuk-guidance-on-gra-consultation/) 
WPUK and affiliated organisations have organised meetings across the UK at which speakers 
have directly positioned trans women as a potential threat to ‘women’. A key rhetorical tactic 
here is the intentional mis-gendering of trans women. At one meeting, for example, a 
speaker’s presentation consisted of slides of photographs of UK trans women whose 
appearances were mocked as they were talked of with male pronouns; the message being that 
these were not women, but men ‘pretending’ to be women. As I have previously suggested 
(Hines, 2019), the notion of ‘deception’ is central to feminist denouncements of transgender 
people. In turn, this links to media-propelled cases of ‘gender fraud’ where people have been 
tried and/or convicted of concealing their gender identities from their sexual partners (see 
Whittle, 2013, Sharpe, 2018).  For Elisabeth Grosz, in such instances, the law does not seek 
‘not to protect sexual autonomy against fraudulent solicitation of sex, but rather to protect 
gender norms and compulsory heterosexuality’ (2009: 165). The gender fraud argument also 
fuels current provocations against lesbian trans women from some sections of lesbian and/or 
feminist groups. At London’s 2018 Pride march, for example, a group of women positioned 
themselves at the front of the parade with banners calling for the ‘T’ (trans) to be removed 
from the LGBT acronym.  Correspondingly, the group ‘Get the L out’ have organised a 
 
Cis, or cisgender, is a term for someone whose identity is congruent with the sex that they were assigned at 
birth.  
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number of events at which the lesbian identities of trans women have been refuted.  As 
journalist Gemma Stone (2019) has recently documented, their presence has become usual at 
Pride events across the UK and internationality.   
Though small in number and with much opposition from the majority of members of feminist 
and LGBT communities, anti-trans feminist groups have had a high media profile in the UK 
and have linked with international organisations such as the US group ‘Hands Across the 
Aisle’.  Under the tagline ‘gender is the problem not the solution’, Hands Across the Aisle’s 
websites declares that:  
For the first time, women from across the political spectrum have come together to 
challenge the notion that gender is the same as sex. We are radical feminists, lesbians, 
Christians and conservatives that are tabling our ideological differences to stand in 
solidarity against gender identity legislation, which we have come to recognize as the 
erasure of our own hard-won civil rights. As the Hands Across the Aisle Coalition, we 
are committed to working together, rising above our differences, and leveraging our 
collective resources to oppose gender identity ideology.  
(https://handsacrosstheaislewomen.com/home/) 
The irony of feminist groups aligning themselves with the US Christian right who have 
activated so rigorously against women’s reproductive rights is clearly astounding. It is 
important to reiterate that this is a minority feminist position, yet, it is one that shows no sign 
of abating.  At the time of writing, for example, a group led by academics Sheila Jeffreys and 
Heather Brunskell-Evans have produced a ‘Declaration of Women’s Sex-Based Rights, 
which seeks to:  
[…] re-affirm that women's human rights are based upon sex. It argues that 
these rights are being eroded by the promotion of “gender identity”, and that the 
inclusion of men who claim to be women in the category “women” undermines the 
whole notion and practice of women's rights as human rights.  
(www.womensgrid.org.uk) 
In recent years, then, UK organisations have sought to isolate sex from gender, placing it as 
the apex of what makes a woman. From this perspective, sex is tightly defined by genitals, 
reproductive organs, and chromosomal and hormonal make-up, while gender is characterised 
as identity.  While the latter is (sometimes) granted the possibility of fluidity, sex, it is 
argued, is only ever binary – male/female. Though gender may be subject to change, sex is 
fixed: a trans woman may ‘identify as’ a woman but she will never be a woman since sex-as-
natural-biology is the defining component of womanhood. Behind the superficiality of gender 
lays the substance of sex. We are, then, back to Raymond’s (1979) argument that trans 
women are, essentially, men.  The argument then follows that trans women are a potential 
danger to ‘real’ women, especially in the context of sex-segregated spaces: a man may appear 
as a woman in order to access women’s toilets or changing rooms with the intention of 
committing sexually abusive acts. This claim is forwarded as a rallying cry against proposed 
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changes to the GRA despite evidence of such occurrences in countries where legal self-
declaration of gender recognition is already in place.  
Reducing womanhood to reproductive capacity and role undoes decades of feminist work that 
has sought to upturn conservative thought that relegates gender role to sex.  Further, the 
positioning of sex as the source of oppression presumes a universal characteristic of 
womanhood in which all cis women are disadvantaged in the same way.  Work by feminists 
of colour, disabled, lesbian and bisexual, working class, and trans feminists has provided rich 
analysis of the intersecting facets of women’s oppression, pointing to the ways in which 
minority women are discounted for within dominant feminist frameworks that offer a narrow 
definition of what a woman – and thus a feminist subject – is (white, able bodied, 
heterosexual, middle class and cisgender).  Universal accounts of womanhood have thus been 
subject to important critique at political and conceptual levels.  
There is, then, nothing new in the policing of ‘woman’ to limit feminist political membership; 
as acutely illustrated by black feminist activist Sojourner Truth’s rhetorical question ‘Ain’t I 
a woman’? in her speech to white suffrage campaigners at a women’s rally in Ohio in 1851.  
As I have argued elsewhere (Hines, 2007; 2014, 2017) conflicts around the category woman 
have consistently beset feminist thought and activism. Current attempts to exclude trans 
women from feminism could be seen simply as the latest instance within a very long tradition 
wherein dominant women seek to, literally, construct feminism in their own image. Yet, as 
the chapter moves on to explore, the binary articulation of sex in order to serve an 
exclusionary agenda is scientifically, as well as politically, untenable.  
The Diversity of Sex  
There are clearly considerable variations in both the genitalia and the reproductive organs of 
people placed within the expansive categories of male and female: some men are born 
without testicles and some women without a uterus; some men do not produce sperm as some 
women do not produce eggs; genitalia and reproductive organs can change throughout a man 
or woman’s life due to injury or surgery. There are also significant diversities in the hormonal 
and chromosomal make up of men and women. In her book ‘Myths of Sex, Science and 
Society’ neuroscientist Cordelia Fine challenges understandings of sex that are based on 
hormonal difference; what she terms that ‘familiar, plausible, pervasive and powerful story’ 
(2017).  In her narration of ‘Testosterone Rex’, Fine pays particular attention to myths around 
testosterone. Though ‘Testosterone Rex’ appears to be ‘undefeatable’, Fine shows how, to the 
contrary, the ‘sexual natural order’ is diverse and malleable (2017). There are, she argues, 
more similarities in the biological make-up of men and women than differences. Work on 
intersex by scholars such as Fausto-Sterling (1985, 1993, 2000, 2019) and Kessler (1998) 
also configures sex outside a binary; in this instance bringing to light the diversity of 
chromosomal make-up. As Morgan Carpenter argues:  
Intersex people and bodies have been considered incapable of integration into society. 
Medical interventions on often healthy bodies remain the norm, addressing perceived 
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familial and cultural demands, despite concerns about necessity, outcomes, conduct 
and consent.  
(Carpenter, 2016, p. 74) 
 
Though Western culture is, as Fausto-Sterling says, ‘deeply committed to the idea that there 
are only two sexes’ (1993, p. 68) there are many  human chromosomal combinations other 
than XX (typically used to denote female) and XY (typically used to denote male): 
‘biologically speaking, there are many gradations running from female to male; and 
depending on how one calls the shots, one can argue that along that spectrum lie at least five 
sexes-and perhaps even more’ (Fausto-Sterling, 1993, p. 68).  Further, ‘each of those 
categories is in itself complex; the percentage of male and female characteristics, for 
instance, can vary enormously among members of the same subgroup’ (1993, p. 68). In her 
most recent work, Anne Fausto-Sterling thus proposes an orthogonal model, which 
‘intertwines sex, gender, orientation, bodies, and cultures without a demand to choose one 
over the other’ (Fausto-Sterling, 2019).   
As gender verification in Olympic sports shows, attempts to fit biological, hormonal and 
chromosomal diversity into a binary model are frequently unsuccessful (see Erikainen, 2020).  
As bone researcher Alexandra Kralick has argued, many athletes are let down by attempts to 
‘draw a hard line between the sexes’, a practice, which, for Kralick, ‘represents a 
fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of biological sex. Science keeps showing us 
that sex also doesn’t fit in a binary, whether it be determined by genitals, chromosomes, 
hormones, or bones’ (2017).  Attempts to define ‘woman’ on the bases of biology or genetics, 
then, raises a range of sticky questions for the rights of trans, cis, and/or intersex women; as 
Ruth Pearce asks: 
 If we are to define womanhood on the basis of genetics, how can we account for 
 intersex conditions such as androgen insensitivity syndrome, which mean that some 
 people born with XY chromosomes have ‘female’ genitalia and secondary sexual 
 characteristics? If we are to define womanhood on the basis of an ability to 
 conceive, carry a pregnancy, give birth and breastfeed a child, how are we to account 
 for hysterectomy, mastectomy, sterility, women born without wombs? How, 
 moreover, are we to account for a woman’s right not to be defined by her reproductive 
 capacity?         
(Pearce, 2019, p. 22, emphasis in original) 
 
There is, therefore, much evidence to counter binary readings of sex, which indicates the 
fault-lines of sexual dimorphism, or what Ruth Hubbard critiques as the ‘astonishingly weak 
empirical foundations on which the medical orthodoxies of binary sex and gender are built’ 
(1998: 198). The reduction of gender to sex within some strains of feminism is thus 
scientifically as well as politically problematic; to return to Pearce:  
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 This argument assumes that there is something essential and inherent about a 
 ‘woman’s body’, that can be shared by cis women (individuals assigned female at 
 birth who do not reject this assignation) but not trans women. It moreover posits that 
 there is something universal about the shared social experiences of cis women that 
 trans women cannot share, thereby positioning the ‘social construction’ of 
 womanhood as a deterministic form of socialisation rather than evidence of gender’s 
 artifice and malleability.       
(Pearce, 2019, p. 21) 
 
Further still, campaigns to exclude trans women from gender segregated spaces on the basis 
of natural difference rest upon an alarmingly simple premise that such bodily distinctions can 
be easily noted.  Critical – and deeply ethical – questions also become apparent when 
considering how  for example, through genital examination or chromosome tests – such sex 
monitoring may be conducted. Aside from the impossible task of simplifying the dynamism 
of human bodies, questions around how, and by whom, gendered bodies could be observed, 
certified and regulated in public spaces are starkly pertinent.  
The paradoxes and problematics of using ‘sex’ to articulate bodies are thus profound. Almost 
thirty years ago Catherine MacKinnon (1991) pointed to the interchangeable use of sex and 
gender and, in following decades, the language of sex to denote bodily difference has become 
increasingly redundant. Thus, the terms sex and gender have become transposable in 
everyday speech as well as in the language of policy and law. As Sandland (2005) has 
indicated, the terms are used interchangeably in the GRA itself, while, ironically, the 
International Olympic Committee now speak of ‘gender’ and not ‘sex’ verification practices.   
A concerted linguistic move from sex to gender would not only be significant in ironing out 
vernacular inconsistencies. More importantly, it would offer a more successful model through 
which account for the complexities of bodies and identities; a project that must be uppermost 
for feminism if it is remain vital for current and future times. Key to this is the dual task of 
productively accounting for difference and articulating modes of commonality. With this in 
mind, the chapter moves on to explore key overlapping concerns within trans and feminist 
politics, paying particular attention to the issue of bodily autonomy.   
Tracing Common Ground 
The body has long been a key feminist issue. Within second wave feminism the body was 
central to the notion that the ‘personal is political’ and explicit in two of the eight demands of 
the Women’s Liberation Movement in the 1970s: free contraception and abortion on demand, 
and an end to all discrimination against lesbians and a woman’s right to define her own 
sexuality. These demands motivated a number of feminist right-based claims surrounding, for 
example, reproductive choice and sexual agency, autonomy around childbirth and sexual 
health, the fostering of positive body image and improving cultural representations of 
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women’s bodies and sexualities. Feminist campaigns around these issues have led directly to 
changes in law, for example, around the availability of contraception and access to abortion, 
legislating against sexual harassment, and improving media standards; while improving 
women’s control around how and where to give birth, and increasing input into issues 
concerning health and well-being.  In each instance, self-determination around how the body 
is understood, portrayed and treated is held as a primary source of women’s ability to lead 
better lives. The body, then, becomes a basis for liberation.   
For trans women, too, the body is deeply political. Trans women, and especially trans women 
of colour, endure extremely high levels of sexual violence and domestic abuse, in addition to 
sexualisation and objectification in the media –represented as both a subject of fear and of 
fascination. Moreover, many countries across the globe still compel trans people to undergo 
surgical interventions prior to recognition, with 16 countries in Europe and Central Asia 
alone maintaining sterilization requirements (Transgender Europe, 2019); a practice that the 
United Nations cite as a human rights violation. Thus, issues around the recognition of, and 
the rights afforded to, gendered bodies have remained constant campaigning issues for trans 
movements since their inception in the 1970s.  Indeed, here, the right to embodiment is the 
political motivator.  Concerns around medical practice and health care are paramount to trans 
rights movements (see Davy 2011; Vincent, 201; Pearce, 2018), and issues of gendered 
violence and sexual harassment remain increasingly important.  Further, the representation of 
trans bodies, particularly in the media, is an important campaigning issue.  Reflecting on how 
issues of bodily autonomy are crucial for both cis and trans women at the levels of the 
individual, social and political confirms the inclusive temperament of ‘woman’; indicating 
further the errors of trans-exclusionary feminism.  At this juncture it is important to turn to 
work that has explicitly addressed the interconnections of trans and feminist projects.  
Jacob Hale’s (1996) consideration of the potential for both distinct and connected 
characteristics of women is productive for the development of inclusive feminism. Hale 
points to the specific qualities that are taken to denote ‘woman’, including biological make-
up and appearance, gender behaviour, gender role and gendered history. Of these, particular 
characteristics may, he suggests, have incompatible degrees of importance with others. A 
trans woman may, for example, have different genitals to someone who is assumed to be a cis 
woman though outwardly her appearance means that she experiences social (including sex) 
discrimination in the same way. Vaginal hypoplasia, for example, may result in an 
underdeveloped or entirely absent vagina in people who are assigned female at birth. Susan 
Kessler and Wendy McKenna (1978) accordingly use the concept of ‘cultural genitals’ rather 
than ‘biological genitals’. What is important here are social perceptions of biological 
difference rather than biological characteristics themselves. As Jason Cromwell (1999) has 
argued, bodily materiality only emerges through social interaction. 
Henry Rubin (1996) sought to conceive of a feminism that was able to take account of what 
he called ‘differently located bodies which appear similar in form’ (1998:308). Rubin 
proposed an ‘action paradigm’, whereby political practice, rather than biology, is centred 
within feminism in order to enable an analysis of embodiment without essentialist 
connotations. Similarly, Julia Serano (2013) argues that feminism has to be large enough to 
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account for the femininities of women who were not assigned female at birth.  In Emi 
Koyama’s ‘transfeminism’ ‘no political, medical or religious authority shall violate the 
integrity of our bodies against our will or impede our decisions regarding what to do with 
them’ (2003).  Transfeminism, Koyama suggests, believes in ‘fostering an environment 
where women’s individual choices are honoured, while scrutinizing and challenging 
institutions that limit the range of choices available to them’ (2003: 247).  To my mind, 
Koyama’s treaty articulates the essence of the slogan ‘the personal is political’. Alongside 
bodily autonomy, Koyama identifies body image, violence, and reproductive and health care 
as connecting issues of importance for all women.  
Rachel Anne Williams (2019) maps three waves of trans feminism that echo the waves of 
feminism per say. As the first wave of Western feminism sought to recognise women at the 
levels of the political and public through suffrage campaigns, the first wave of trans feminism 
brought trans women to public attention in the 1950s through, for example, media reporting 
of Christine Jorgenson’s hormonal transition. Central to second wave feminism, were legal 
demands for equality, common also, Williams suggests, to second wave trans feminism’s 
campaigns for improvements in health care, housing and employment. Key to feminism’s 
third wave has been the question of difference. Here Williams addresses the turn to 
intersectionality within feminism as writers and activists honed-in further on the ways in 
which race, class, sexuality and disability impact on gendered identity and experience. This 
concern is also reflected, according to Williams, in the increasing recognition of different 
ways of being gender diverse within trans communities.    
In their introduction to an issue of ‘Transgender Studies Quarterly’ (TSQ) on 
trans/feminisms, Susan Stryker and Talia M. Bettcher (2016) similarly show how Kimberlé 
Crenshaw’s notion of intersectionality motivates trans feminism. Stryker and Bettcher 
emphasize the alliances between trans women and women and colour, both of whom have 
represented groups excluded from the interests of white cis feminism. As Jack Halberstam 
concurs: 
 Intersectionality remains a very important tool within any attempt to understand the 
 historical arc of relations between trans* people and feminist and queer communities 
 precisely because, while white women were often exclusively focused on issues of 
 womanhood, people of colour could not afford a singular focus.  
(Halberstam, 2018, p. ) 
As the feminism issue of TSQ illustrates, in many parts of the world (Brazil, Ecuador, Spain, 
Russia, France and Italy) there exist strong alliances between feminist and trans communities. 
In writing about trans feminism in Ecuador, Claudia Sofía Garriga-López, for example, 
shows that the divisions between trans and feminism that are apparent in the UK are not 
evident in other parts of the globe where trans struggles are seen as an integral part of the 
fight against patriarchy and colonialism:  
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 Trans activists have been at the forefront of feminist and LGBT struggles for many 
 decades, and the category of ‘transfeminism’ signals the articulation of these practices 
 into a cohesive political standpoint.       
(Garriga-Lopez, 2016, p. 107)
   
Tracing feminist alliances is also important to enable a move beyond neo-liberal goals of 
recognition and to hope for more than inclusion. Making visible the connections between 
different groups of subordinated women is therefore important if, as feminists, we are to 
ensure that our movement retains a political commitment. Strengthening the allegiances 
between women who are marginalized on the basis of class, sexuality, disability, faith, race 
and ethnicity is crucial for a feminist praxis of social justice.  
Conclusions 
This chapter has addressed the emergence in UK feminism of what has become known as a 
‘trans-exclusionary radical feminist’ (TERF) perspective. This standpoint is positioned 
against proposed changes to the Gender Recognition Act, which are anticipated to introduce 
self-identification in order to make the administrative process of gender recognition more 
straightforward. Although this is a marginal feminist perspective, it has become increasingly 
vocal in recent years, buoyed by support from some feminists with high media profiles. The 
chapter has outlined, and critiqued, the ways in which an essentialist reading of sex has re-
emerged within these debates.  
The move to define the identity and experience of woman through a purely biological lens is, 
I have argued, problematic in several ways.  First, the presumption that the category of 
woman denotes a universal experience, wherein reproductive function is central to women’s 
oppression, negates individual, historical and cultural specificity. This reductive reading of 
sex is problematic for the distinct ways in which sex – and gender – have been understood in 
different times and places, and in relation to the varied sexed make-up of bodies themselves.   
While not denying the materiality, or the material consequences, of the body in women’s 
oppression, I suggest that it is perceived reproductive function that figures as a site of control, 
not reproductive capacity in and of itself.  For who knows the body parts and genetic make-
up of strangers? That it is common for trans-exclusionary feminists to assume that they are 
always able to recognise a trans woman makes this a substantial, rather than a rhetorical, 
question. In attempts to argue for the exclusion of trans women from competitive women’s 
sport, trans-exclusionary feminists, for example, recently turned to social media to question 
the genders of a group of successful Chinese cis women athletes. Using the media photograph 
of the celebrating team members, three of the group were declared to be transgender – or in 
their nomenclature, male. Such moves highlight the white western-centric lens through which 
gender is, literally, seen, and reinstated by misogynistic tropes of how women’s bodies 
should appear in order to be recognised and valued.  
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The subsequent feminist trans-exclusionary argument that men may appear in public spaces 
as women in order physically and sexually abuse women, is also nonsensical through this line 
of questioning. For, how and by whom can the body parts and genetic make-up of strangers 
be observed and regulated? A trans-exclusionary politics of moral panic has, for example, 
recently led to cases where cis women have been asked to leave women’s toilets because they 
have been assumed to be trans. Moreover, as has been explored, work on sex variation and 
natural diversity indicates the fault-lines in attempts to strictly define sexed bodies. What is at 
stake here are understandings of sex, not sex itself. The chapter has thus drawn on a range of 
work that locates the category of woman (and that of man) at the site of the cultural and the 
political. ‘Woman’, I suggest, becomes a productive category when it is freed from sex. I 
therefore argue for a linguistic move away from sex and towards gender in social, cultural, 
legal and medical discourse.    
The category ‘woman’ also appears at its most politically effective when it is opened out to 
account for differently gendered bodies. As trans feminist work has shown, it is then possible 
to trace the common ground between the specific feminist projects of women - and non-
binary people - who are differently located. Not only is this crucial for understanding the 
diversity of gendered bodies, it is key to accounting for the structural forces and power 
dynamics of class, race, disability and sexuality. Allegiances across these lines of difference 
are vital for a transformative political project that theorizes and activates against patriarchal 
forces as they are constructed through varied systems of oppression. Sara Ahmed (2016) 
thinks of this as a politics that is built through an ‘affinity of hammers’, which work to chip 
away at the system.  I suggest that it is only through securing a political framework that seeks 
to be respectfully mindful of difference and committed to alliance-building that feminism can 
retain its political purpose so as to be fit for current times.    
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